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In early 1990, a California trial judge set April 3, 1990 as the
date for Robert Alton Harris to be executed in the gas chamber at
San Quentin. Harris, convicted in 1979 of two murders, would be
the first person executed in California since 1967. It would be a ma-
jor news event.
On February 6, 1990, the California Department of Correc-
tions had issued an "advisory" to the news media, stating that four-
teen news media representatives (a reduction from twenty-five or
more under previous wardens) would be included as witnesses to the
execution. The advisory required news organizations wishing to
cover the event to submit applications identifying their proposed rep-
resentatives by February 16, 1990. Nearly every significant news or-
ganization in California applied. The applicant list included news-
papers, television and radio stations and networks, along with many
national, and even international, news organizations.
KQED, a public television station, was working on a documen-
tary on the impending Harris execution. The station wrote to the
warden of San Quentin, requesting permission to videotape the exe-
cution. Warden Daniel Vasquez rejected the request, stating that
"no filming, recording, video taping or photographs of the execution"
would be allowed. KQED also learned that, in anticipation of the
execution, the warden had revised the prison procedure governing
press coverage of executions. The warden's new procedure expressly
prohibited media witnesses at the execution from using any of the
* J.D. Harvard, 1963; Lecturer, Graduate School of Journalism, University of Califor-
nia, Berkeley.
** J.D. Yale Law School, 1985.
The authors served as counsel for KQED in the litigation discussed in this article,
KQED v. Vasquez, No. C 90-1383 RHS (N.D. Cal). The article is based in large part on the
briefs the authors submitted in the litigation.
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tools of their trade - pencils, note pads, sketch pads, drawing im-
plements, tape recorders, still cameras, or television cameras.
The Harris execution was stayed by the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals on March 30, 1990,' for reasons having nothing to do with
press coverage. However, because the warden's press restrictions
would govern all future executions in California's gas chamber,2
KQED filed suit for declaratory and injunctive relief on May 10,
1990. The suit challenged, on First Amendment grounds, the gov-
ernmental restrictions on press coverage of executions and use of
standard reporting tools. It also challenged the process by which the
fourteen media witnesses would be selected.'
The case was assigned to United States District Court Judge
Robert H. Schnacke. In due course, the warden moved for summary
judgment arguing, inter alia, that because the press had no First
Amendment right to be present at executions, KQED had no right to
use cameras or complain about any of the warden's restrictions.
KQED conducted certain discovery and cross-moved for summary
judgment. KQED contended that because the State in fact permitted
media witnesses, the issue was whether the restrictions on effective
reporting were valid. Judge Schnacke denied both parties' motions
and set trial for March 25, 1991.
Five days before trial began, the warden announced by press
release, and then had his lawyers inform the court, that he had again
changed the San Quentin procedure for press coverage of execu-
tions-no reporters would be allowed to witness executions. The
reason for this action was KQED's lawsuit. Warden Vasquez testi-
fied that he did not want to risk having to defend in court his process
for selecting reporters or his restrictions on their equipment.' He
therefore decided to exclude all reporters from covering executions.
Based on this new press ban, the warden moved to dismiss the suit,
biut Judge Schnacke allowed the trial to proceed.
1. Harris v. Vasquez, No. 90-55402 (9th Cir. Mar. 30, 1990) (Noonan, J.). Harris was
executed two years later, on April 21, 1992, after the Supreme Court directed that "[njo fur-
ther stays of Robert Alton Harris' execution shall be entered by the federal courts except upon
order of this Court." Vasquez v. Harris, 112 S. Ct. 1713, No. A-768 (Apr. 21, 1992).
2. At the time over 275 persons were already sentenced to death in California.
3. The complaint sought declaratory and injunctive relief barring the State from denying
effective media access, including television, if the condemned person did not object. The com-
plaint specified that, if granted relief, KQED would not videotape any execution over the
objection of the condemned person without further order of the court.
4. Reporter's Transcript, 3-464, 3-475, 3-504, KQED v. Vasquez, No. C 90-1383 RHS




To rebut the Warden's new defense that the issues were moot
because the press was now completely excluded, KQED requested a
recess after the defense rested to allow KQED's lawyers to gather
evidence concerning the history of press and public access to Califor-
nia executions - evidence supporting a First Amendment-based
right of access. When the evidence was presented, Judge Schnacke
found as a fact that California executions always had been open to
press and public. The court directed further briefing of the First
Amendment issues.
On June 7, 1991, Judge Schnacke ruled from the bench. He
found that it was "irrational and unreasonable and capricious" for
the warden to bar the press entirely from executions and that there
was "no adequate justification" to prohibit reporters from using pen-
cils and paper.' However, he accepted the warden's security concerns
about the use of cameras. Specifically, he found that prison personnel
who participate in executions "frequently want their identities con-
cealed," fearing possible retaliation. The court also credited the war-
den's concern that a "suicidal cameraperson" might hurl a camera at
the glass in the gas chamber, killing everyone. Finally, the court
found valid the warden's concern that if pictures of an execution
were broadcast and prisoners saw them, this "could spark severe
prisoner reaction that might be dangerous to the safety of prison per-
sonnel." 6 The court found the warden within his rights in believing
that "no risk" should be tolerated.7
The court's judgment, entered August 2, 1991, enjoined the
warden from excluding the press entirely and from prohibiting the
use of pencils and paper, but rejected KQED's claim to use cameras
or tape recorders. Neither side appealed.
Robert Alton Harris was executed on April 21, 1992.' The exe-
cution was observed by 48 persons, including 18 reporters. 9 Appar-
ently, no news organization applied to televise or photograph the ex-
ecution. However, a few days before the execution, a civil rights suit
had been brought by three condemned prisoners, including Harris,
on behalf of a class of death-sentenced prisoners.10 The suit chal-
lenged the method of execution by lethal gas as cruel and unusual
5. Reporter's Transcript, June 7, 1991, at 3.
6. Id. at 11.
7. Id. at 12.
8. See supra note 1.
9. Morain and Gorman, Harris Dies After Judicial Duel, L.A. TIMEs, Apr. 22, 1992
at 1.
10. Fierro v. Gomez, No. C 92 1482 MHP (N.D. Cal. Apr. 21, 1992)
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punishment under the Eighth Amendment. The District Court, to
preserve "material evidence not otherwise available from any other
source," and with Harris' consent, issued an order directing the war-
den to permit an agent of the plaintiffs' counsel to videotape the exe-
cution."1 The tape was to be deposited with the court under seal and
would not be provided to anyone except by order of the court. 2
Because inevitably some news organization will seek to video-
tape a future execution, and because the KQED case received such
widespread coverage in the news media with only abbreviated con-
sideration of the legal theory, it seems useful to analyze here the
First Amendment issues. This article will explain why the KQED
court was correct in holding that the warden cannot, consistent with
the First Amendment, exclude reporters from attending executions.
The article will examine how the court was incorrect, however, in
ruling that the process by which the state selected the particular me-
dia witnesses passes First Amendment muster. Finally, the article
will discuss why the court's upholding of the warden's restrictions on
the use of standard reporting tools was constitutionally unsound.
II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT OF ACCESS
In its lawsuit, KQED did not contend that either the press or
the public has a First Amendment right of general or random access
to prisons." Rather, the contention was that, under the analysis es-
tablished by Supreme Court precedent, the state -prisons warden's
elimination of press witnesses from executions violated the First
Amendment.
The Supreme Court's analysis relies on two factors to determine
whether there is a First Amendment right of access to various gov-
ernment proceedings. First, the Court considers whether the pro-
ceeding in question has historically been open, in which case the
Court presumes a right of access.' 4 Second, the Court considers
whether access contributes to the self-governing function of demo-
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. KQED previously had sought unsuccessfully to establish a First Amendment right
of access to a county jail. While a four-Justice plurality held that there was no such right in
Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1 (1978), subsequent access decisions have altered the analysis.
See infra text accompanying notes 15-26.
14. A traditionally open proceeding obviously does not mean that it has always been
conducted in a public square or other venue open to unlimited numbers of the general public.
It includes situations like courtrooms and the witness area at the San Quentin gas chamber
facility, where there is limited capacity but sufficient space to accommodate a reasonable num-
ber of press and other public representatives.
[Vol. 321138
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cratic government (the "functional" consideration).
A. The Case Law Analysis
In four separate cases, the Supreme Court has held that there is
a First Amendment right of access, by both press and public, to the
most sensitive proceedings in the criminal justice system. 5 As Justice
Stevens remarked in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Commonwealth
of Virginia," the first of these decisions: "[tlhis is a watershed case..
• .Today . . .for the first time, the Court unequivocally holds that
an arbitrary interferience with access to important information is an
abridgment of the freedoms of speech and of the press protected by
the First Amendment."
'17
In Richmond Newspapers, Chief Justice Burger exhaustively
canvassed the historical basis for having open criminal trials, finding
the "keystone" to be "the therapeutic value of open justice."'" The
Chief Justice continued: "[w]hen a shocking crime occurs, a commu-
nity reaction of outrage and public protest often follows. Thereafter
the open processes of justice serve an important prophylactic pur-
pose, providing an outlet for community concern, hostility, and
emotion.""
In terms directly applicable to the death penalty, Chief Justice
Burger stated:
Civilized societies withdraw both from the victim and the vigi-
lante the enforcement of criminal laws, but they cannot erase
from people's consciousness the fundamental, natural yearning
to see justice done - or even the urge for retribution. The cru-
cial prophylactic aspects of the administration of justice cannot
function in the dark; no community catharsis can occur if justice
is "done in a corner [or] in any covert manner."'"
Thus, "the appearance of justice can best be provided by allowing
people to observe it. . . .People in an open society do not demand
infallibility from their institutions, but it is difficult for them to ac-
15. Press-Enterprise v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1 (1986) (Press-Enterprise 1H) (access
to preliminary proceedings); Press-Enterprise v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501 (1984) (Press
Enterprise ) (access to voir dire of prospective jurors in death penalty case); Globe Newspa-
per Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1980) (access to trial involving sex offenses with
minors as victims); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (access to
criminal trial).
16. 448 U.S. 555 (1980)
17. Id. at 582, 583 (Stevens, J., concurring).
18. Id. at 569 (quoting Jeremy Bentham).
19. Id. at 571 (citation omitted).
20. d.
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cept what they are prohibited from observing. ' .. Chief Justice Bur-
ger also noted that the people do not acquire information about
criminal proceedings by firsthand information but "acquire it chiefly
through the print and electronic media."2"
The Court relied on the same historical and functional reason-
ing in the other access cases.2" In Press-Enterprise v. Superior
Court (Press Enterprise I),2" returning again to the "community
therapeutic value" in openness, Chief Justice Burger said "[w]hen
the public is aware that the law is being enforced and the criminal
justice system is functioning, an outlet is provided for these under-
standable 'reactions and emotions" like "retribution."2 5 In each of the
four access cases, the Court also emphasized the First Amendment
guarantee that public discussion of government affairs be an in-
formed one, free of unnecbssary restraints on press coverage of the
criminal justice system.26
21. Richmond Newspapers, Inc., 448 U.S. at 572.
22. Id. at 573. See id. at 577 n.12. In the case of California executions, the press wit-
nesses act as the agents of the public at large, both because the witness area capacity is limited
and because the official witnesses are hand-picked by the warden and not selected as neutral
witnesses.
The idea that the press acts as the representative of the public was well put by Justice
Powell: the individual citizen can seldom "obtain for himself the information needed for the
intelligent discharge of his political responsibilities .... In seeking out the news the press
therefore acts as an agent of the public .... The underlying right is the right of the public
generally. The press is the necessary representative of the public's interest." Saxbe v. Wash-
ington Post, 417 U.S. 843, 863-64 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting). See also Cox Broadcasting
Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975).
23. See Press-Enterprise v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1 (1986) (Press-Enterprise II);
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1980). See also Oregonian Publishing
Co. v. United States District Court, 920 F.2d 1462, 1465 (9th Cir. 1990) (access mandated
where historically press and public attended and access "would further the public's interest in
understanding the criminal justice system"); Seattle Times v. United States District Court, 845
F.2d 1513, 1515 (9th Cir. 1988); CBS v. United States District Court, 785 F.2d 823 (9th Cir.
1985); Associated Press v. United States District Court, 705 F.2d 1143 (9th Cir. 1983); United
States v. Brooklier, 685 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1982); WJW-TV v. Cleveland, 686 F. Supp. 177
(N.D. Ohio 1988), vacated as moot, 878 F.2d 906 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 74
(1989) (city council meetings); Society of Professional Journalists v. Secretary of Labor, 616 F.
Supp. 569 (D. Utah 1985), appeal dismissed with directions to vacate as moot, 832 F.2d 1180
(10th Cir. 1987) (administrative hearings); Cable News Network v. ABC, 518 F. Supp. 1238,
1244-45 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (television access to presidential press conference).
24. 464 U.S. 501 (1984).
25. Id. at 508-09.
26. The Ninth Circuit has interpreted the Supreme Court's reasoning to support a con-
stitutional right of access both to pretrial hearings and documents and to sentencing and post-
trial proceedings. Oregonian Publishing Co. v. United States District Court, 920 F.2d 1462,
1465 (9th Cir. 1990) (plea agreement); Seattle Times v. United States District Court, 845
F.2d 1513, 1515 (9th Cir. 1988); CBS v. United States District Court, 785 F.2d 823 (9th Cir.
1985); Associated Press v. United States District Court, 705 F.2d 1143 (9th Cir. 1983); United
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B. The Historical Factor
The public and the press have always had access to California
executions. Moreover, press and citizen witnesses have been treated
interchangeably, with no discrimination against either. For example,
identified reporters frequently have signed the death warrants as of-
ficial witnesses. In past executions, the practice was to leave about
half the space for reporters, and the other half for official witnesses.
Based on the historical evidence at trial, Judge Schnacke found as a
fact that press and public have witnessed executions throughout Cal-
ifornia history. The evidence not only traced the press and public
access but placed it in the context of the evolution of the relevant
statutory provisions.
Before 1858, California executions were conducted in public
places and "a substantial proportion of California's residents had
witnessed executions." 2 In 1858, the Legislature enacted a law pro-
viding that executions would no longer be done in public places but
would be performed by county sheriffs in the presence of various
witnesses."8 While this meant that California executions would be
held in places like jail yards rather than town squares, it did not
mean that the press and public would be excluded from witnessing
executions.
The county sheriff was required to invite various people to ex-
ecutions, including "twelve respectable citizens." ' Twelve was
merely the minimum; the law provided that the sheriff could invite a
larger number. At an execution just months after the 1858 law went
into effect, "[t]here were, in the prison, as spectators of the execu-
tion, about one hundred persons, among whom were ministers, of-
ficers, doctors, lawyers, reporters, etc."80 The following year, the
witnesses to an execution were "those in the jail yard, consisting of
States v. Brooklier, 685 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1982). Even where proceedings "do not share
with criminal trials an unbroken history of public access," they cannot be closed if they would
"benefit from public scrutiny" and are "of major importance to the administration of justice."
Seattle Times, 845 F.2d at 1517. In CBS v. United States District Court, dealing with post-
sentencing proceedings, then Judge (now Justice) Kennedy remarked that "[p]ublic examina-
tion, study and comment is essential if the corrections process is to improve." 785 F.2d at 826
(emphasis added).
27. People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880, 889 (Cal. 1972).
28. Act of April 21, 1858, GENERAL LAWS OF CALIFORNIA, 1850-1864, para. 2686
(abolishing public executions).
29. Id.
30. Execution of Henry F.W. Mowes, DAILY EVENING BULLETIN (San Francisco), Dec.
10, 1858, at 2 (emphasis added).
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about one hundred spectators." 1 When California enacted its first
Penal Code in 1872, the pertinent statutory language was codified in
section 1229 and altered slightly to provide that the county sheriff
invite "at least" twelve "reputable" citizens and that "no other per-
sons than those mentioned in this section can be present at the exe-
cution . . . ." As before, any number of reputable citizens could at-
tend, but at least 12 had to be invited by the county sheriff. 2
In 1891, the Legislature amended Penal Code section 1229 to
provide that executions be conducted in a state prison rather than by
county sheriffs; the pertinent witness requirements remained the
same.3 Following this amendment, in 1894, the witnesses at a San
Quentin execution included "prison officials, physicians and newspa-
per men." 4 In 1898, a newspaper published a list of the names of
180 people who were among those who witnessed an execution at
San Quentin."
Access to California executions by the press and public contin-
ued unabated into this century. The number of witnesses swelled to
throngs at some executions." The presence of reporters is evident
not only as a necessary inference from many newspaper accounts,
but also because they were sometimes specifically identified as such
on witness lists and warrant returns.3 7
31. Execution of William Morris, DAILY EVENING BULLETIN (San Francisco), June
10, 1859, at 3.
32. At an execution in a jail the year following the 1872 amendment, "the halls, above
and below, were crowded to excess." The Scaffold: The Hanging of the Murderer Divine,
DAILY EXAMINER (San Francisco), May 14, 1873, at 3. Included in the "audience in attend-
ance" was at least one reporter who related an eyewitness account. Id. A few years later, in
1877, a man was hung in a specially constructed yard behind the San Rafael courthouse "in
the presence of about three hundred persons." The Gallows: Execution of Juan Salazar This
Afternoon, DAILY EXAMINER (San Francisco), May 31, 1877, at 3. At an 1884 execution,
"every inch of space was filled" after the "crowd of people with passes" had been admitted to
the jail, including reporters who were located "in the reserved space . Exit Wheeler,
DAILY EXAMINER (San Francisco), Jan. 24, 1884, at 2.
33. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1229 (Deering Supp. 1893) (amendment approved Mar. 31,
1891).
34. "Good-bye, All White Men": Lee Sing Steps Bravely Upon the Fatal Trap, THE
EXAMINER (San Francisco), Feb. 3, 1894, at 4 (emphasis added).
35. He Dies A Catholic, THE EXAMINER (San Francisco), Jan. 8, 1898, at 4. The paper
also described how crowds around the state got the news that the execution had occurred from
newspaper bulletins.
36. E.g., Two Murderers Die On Gallows At San Quentin, THE SACRAMENTO BEE,
Oct. 8, 1926, at I ("More than 100 persons" present at San Quentin hanging, specifically
mentioning that newspaperman was there); Dowell Hanged For Murder of Bay Policeman,
THE SACRAMENTO BEE, Aug. 17, 1928, at 3 (eighty-eight witnesses at San Quentin hanging).
37. Such internal prison documents were introduced in evidence as plaintiff's exhibits
44A, 44B, 45A, 46A, 47B [hereinafter PI. Exhs.]. The exhibits are on file with the authors.
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The 1937 statutory change from hanging to lethal gas as the
means of execution did not alter the access of press or public." The
relevant portions of the 1891 statute remain unchanged in the cur-
rent statute."' The law continues to require the warden to invite "at
least 12 reputable citizens," in addition to certain officials, to each
execution. Significant numbers of both press and public continued to
witness executions up to and including the execution of Aaron
Mitchell -in 1967. At Mitchell's execution, there were 58 witnesses,
including many members of the press.4" Warden Vasquez himself
acted in accordance with this historical press access up to five days
before trial of the KQED case. 1 This "unbroken, uncontradicted
history" of press and public attendance at executions creates a "pre-
sumption of openness" of the proceedings. 42
C. Functional Values of Press Attendance
Accurate citizen awareness of the ultimate sanction of our crim-
38. At the first execution in the gas chamber in 1938, there were "[a]pproximately forty
witnesses, including newspaper reporters." Larkin Killers Are Executed By Lethal Gas, THE
SACRAMENTO BEE, Dec. 2, 1938, at 1. There were "more than 100 witnesses" at the second
gas chamber execution, including press members. More Larkin Killers Die in Gas Chambers,
THE SACRAMENTO BEE, Dec. 9, 1938, at 1. There were approximately 100 witnesses at the
fifth gas chamber execution as well. Warden Killer Dies In Gas Chamber, THE OAKLAND
TRIBUNE, Dec. 16, 1938, at 1.
39. CAL. PENAL CODE § 3605 (Deering Supp. 1941). Section 1229 was repealed. Penal
Code § 3605 was based on former Penal Code § 1229. It was adopted in 1941 and amended in
1986 without substantive change.
40. E.g., 58 Watch Execution of Policeman's Killer, THE SAN DIEGO UNION, Apr. 13,
1967, at 1; Wally Trabing, Mostly About People: Execution., THE SANTA CRUZ SENTINEL,
April 13, 1967, at 2. For descriptions of press and public witnesses at other relatively recent
executions, see, for example: Duchess' Aides Die in Gas Chamber, THE S.F. EXAMINER, Nov.
29, 1941, at 3 (approximately 90 witnesses at execution including press); James Pays With
Life In Wife Killing, L.A. TIMES, May 2, 1942, at I (approximately 98 witnesses at execution
including press); Gale Cook, Santo Murder Trio Executed, S.F. EXAMINER, June 4, 1955, at
I (approximately 37 witnesses at execution including 16 newsmen and approximately 50 wit-
nesses at double execution later that day); Mary Crawford, Exclusive! Woman Sees Execution-
'Barbaric,' Writer Says, NEWS-CALL BULLETIN (San Francisco), May 2, 1960, at 1 (sixty
witnesses at Caryl Chessman execution including numerous members of the press, with one
reporting that "ft]here were so many people present it seemed like going to a hanging in a
public park"); State Inter-departmental Communications Memorandum, Oct. 19, 1959, at p.2
(priority for witness permits began with Chessman's five witnesses, followed by press members
and then by "law enforcement agencies and the general public"), Charles Cruttenden, 'Inno-
cent'-Ma Says Last Word, S.F. EXAMINER, Aug. 9, 1962, at 1 (approximately 59 witnesses
at execution including at least six press members).
41. Warden Vasquez testified that "[ilt's been allowed as far as I can determine back in
time". PI. Exh. 23 at 7, 29.
42. Press-Enterprise I1, 478 U.S. at 11; Press-Enterprise 1, 464 U.S. at 510; Globe
Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 605; Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 573.
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
inal justice system is especially important because the constitutional-
ity of the sanction itself (and, in California, the very existence of the
death penalty) depends on the public's values, evolving standards
and attitudes toward capital punishment.4 Information about the
criminal justice system is "of critical importance to our type of gov-
ernment in which the citizenry is the final judge of the proper con-
duct of public business.""
Further, the goals of the criminal justice system are enhanced,
not disserved, by press coverage of the culmination of the most seri-
ous and notorious criminal cases: capital punishment. Deterrence
and retribution values - considered by the courts as validating the
death penalty"' - could only be enhanced by maximum public ex-
posure of the consequences of committing capital crimes.
When state officials undertake to execute someone, they should
not be allowed to do it secretly. The very origin of the requirement
of having witnesses was to ensure that capital punishment was prop-
erly carried out. There would be "ocular evidence" that the officials
actually execute someone, that he is the right person, and that the
execution is performed lawfully and without abuse.' The 19th cen-
tury framers of such legislation intended that news reporters would
serve the function of ensuring that the broader public would be in-
formed whether the punishment had properly been conducted.' 7
Under the warden's eleventh hour rule change, the administra-
tion of the death penalty in California would have been largely con-
cealed from the public. Not only would there be no press witnesses,
but the warden also intended to conceal the identity of the non-press
43. The measure by which the legality of the death penalty has been judged is " 'the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.'" Gregg v. Geor-
gia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell & Stevens, JJ.) (quoting Trop v.
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)). "[A]n assessment of contemporary values concerning the
infliction of a challenged sanction is relevant to the application of the Eighth Amendment." Id.
Thus, the California voters who directly authorize the death penalty, by voter initiative, are
considered a reflection of the current standard of societal decency. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 181
(citing California's statewide referendum as example of society's "endorsement of the death
penalty" to be weighed in Court's analysis of "standards of decency"). This reasoning is ap-
propriate, however, only if those voters have access to accurate and complete information about
executions.
44. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. at 495.
45. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183-87.
46. Louis P. MASUR, RITES OF EXECUTION 115 (1989).
47. Id. The public's interest in receiving information, grounded on First Amendment
principles, has frequently been recognized. See, e.g., Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497
U.S. 547 (1990); Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 756
(1976); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762-65 (1972); Lamont v. Postmaster General,
381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965); Sherrill v. Knight, 569 F.2d 124, 129-30 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
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witnesses. The policy that had always been followed, having wit-
nesses sign the execution warrant return filed in court to verify that
the execution had been carried out according to law, would have
been reversed. The warden testified that he now intended that no
witnesses would sign anything and their identity would not be
disclosed.4
Moreover, one of the warden's criteria for selecting non-press
witnesses was their disinclination to talk with reporters. He advised
the witnesses, whom he personally selected, that he would "do all
[he] can to contain the media" for fear that reporters "may try to
extract an interview or comment from the witnesses." '49 He wanted
"to keep them from talking with the reporters."50 The functional
value of having reporters present becomes a necessity in light of the
warden's selection of and restrictions on non-press witnesses. With-
out the press, the public would learn only what, if anything, the
warden himself chose to reveal about the carrying out of society's
most extreme criminal sanction. This may be commonplace in a to-
talitarian society, but collides head on with the American constitu-
tional system.
In short, press access serves important functional values in a
democratic society. It assures the general public that the prescribed
punishment has been properly carried out according to law, it en-
hances any deterrent and cathartic values associated with capital
punishment, and it provides the public with information about a
uniquely governmental public function. In other words, press access
serves the purpose for which the framers wrote the First Amendment
- it informs the voters and helps make self-government possible. 1
D. No Justification to Rebut Presumption of Openness
"The presumption of openness may be overcome only by an
overriding interest based on findings that closure is essential to pre-
serve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest. ' '..
48. The warden was unable to explain how he would be able to document compliance
with his statutory duty to conduct executions in the presence of the witnesses required by law.
Reporter's Transcript, 3-489, 3-491.
49. Reporter's Transcript, 3-487; Pl. Exh. 17 (letter from warden dated Nov. 19, 1987).
50. Reporter's Transcript, 3-486.
51. More than in the case of press access to polling places to conduct exit polls, press
coverage of executions "makes a legitimate contribution to the quality of public debate." Daily
Herald Co. v. Munro, 838 F.2d 380, 390 (9th Cir. 1988). This is especially important in view
of the unique role of California voters regarding the death penalty. See supra note 43.
52. Press-Enterprise 1, 464 U.S. at 824 (holding state's interest in protecting privacy of
prospective jurors insufficient to justify denying access to voir dire in death penalty case).
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Put another way, closing presumptively open governmental proceed-
ings requires proof of a compelling state interest and that closure
actually is needed to serve that interest."
The KQED case demonstrated the complete absence of a com-
pelling state interest in private executions. The San Quentin warden
did not attempt to prove that any compelling or "overriding interest"
requires excluding the press from executions. The warden testified
that his sole reason for wanting to exclude the press was the KQED
lawsuit; that he had barred the press in an attempt to avoid a ruling
on the press' right to use cameras. This obviously is not "essential to
preserve higher values" and "narrowly tailored" to serve an "over-
riding interest." Just as the state cannot deny access to criminal tri-
als by moving them to prisons, the warden cannot arbitrarily deny
press access to executions.5 4
E. Nondiscriminatory Access to Government Proceedings
It is well settled that the press has access to government facili-
ties at least equal to that enjoyed by other members of the public.
For example, "the press may have the same access to public trials as
does the public."" "[M]ost people receive information concerning
trials through the media whose representatives 'are entitled to the
same rights as the general public.' "56 Indeed, the Supreme Court
noted in Richmond Newspapers that "since courtrooms have limited
capacity, there may be occasions when not every person who wishes
to attend can be accommodated. In such situations, reasonable re-
strictions on general access are traditionally imposed, including pref-
53. Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 15; Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 607. As the
Ninth Circuit pointed out in Daily Herald Co. v. Munro, 838 F.2d 380, 384 n.3 (9th Cir.
1988) (striking down a statute restricting press access to polling places to conduct exit polls),
even where press access is a "qualified" and not an absolute right, "any restriction must be
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest." See also Seattle Times v.
United States District Court, 845 F.2d 1513, 1517-18 (9th Cir. 1988) (findings necessary to
support closure even when balanced against criminal defendant's right to fair trial); CBS v.
United States District Court, 785 F.2d 823, 825 (9th Cir. 1985); WJW-TV v. Cleveland, 686
F. Supp. 177, 180-81 (N.D. Ohio 1988). The City Council in WJW-TV, like the San Quentin
warden, asserted that it was "under no obligation" to produce any reason for closure and that
its decision to open or close was its "exclusive prerogative." The court answered that "[tlhe
First Amendment tolerates no such arbitrary action." WJW-TV, 686 F. Supp. at 181.
54. The warden's actions against the press also included his exclusion of reporters from
San Quentin grounds on the day of an execution, elimination of the traditional warden press
conference following executions and denial of press access to persons who witness executions.
55. Sacramento Bee v. United States District Court, 656 F.2d 477, 483 (9th Cir. 1981).




erential seating for media representatives."5
Similarly, it is precisely "[b]ecause not all members of the pub-
lic will fit into a courtroom [that] the media play an important role
as representatives and may be allowed preferential positions in the
courtroom."' 8 Specifically in the prison setting, the guarantee of
"equal access" must accommodate the press since "terms of access
that are reasonably imposed on individual members of the public
may, if they impede effective reporting without sufficient justifica-
tion, be unreasonable as applied to journalists." 59
California Penal Code section 3605 requires the warden to in-
vite "at least 12 reputable citizens." Given that non-press members
of the public thus continue to have access to executions, the press is
constitutionally entitled to access. There is no valid justification for
excluding reporters while admitting citizen witnesses." This dis-
crimination against the press violates not only the First Amendment
but also the Equal Protection clause, in that there is no valid basis
for distinguishing between the two classes of citizens. The press is
constitutionally protected 'against invidious discrimination."
Judge Schnacke clearly was correct in ruling in the KQED case
that the warden could not bar reporters from attending executions.
While it may have seemed a long leap psychologically from court-
rooms (access to which was established by the Richmond Newspa-
pers line of cases) to the gas chamber, the applicable legal analysis
inexorably led there, especially in light of California's history.
III. FIRST AMENDMENT LIMITS ON GOVERNMENTAL
DISCRETION IN SELECTING PRESS MEMBERS TO COVER
EXECUTIONS
It has long been the rule that when a law "vests unbridled dis-
cretion in a government official over whether to permit or deny ex-
57. Id. at 581 n.18 (emphasis added).
58. United States v. Beckham, 789 F.2d 401, 406 (6th Cir. 1986) (emphasis added).
59. Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1978) (Stewart, J., concurring). See Lewis
v. Baxley, 368 F. Supp. 768, 777 (M.D. Ala. 1973) (three-judge court) ("[Niewsmen have a
right to go where the public generally may go in observance of its government.").
60. Warden Vasquez testified at the KQED trial that he would have "no problem" with
allowing the press to cover executions if they did not bring cameras and recorders, and that
there is no penological justification for excluding the press. Reporter's Transcript 3-475. He
was "willing to go back" if not "threatened with a possible court order to allow broadcast
equipment." Reporter's Transcript, 3-504.
61. See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 963 (2d ed.
1988).
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pressive activity," it is invalid on its face."' The defect in such a
discretionary system is that potential speakers excluded by it "have
no way of proving that the decision was unconstitutionally moti-
vated," that is, "based on the content or viewpoint of the speech be-
ing considered."6
Unlike challenges to government conduct in other contexts,
plaintiffs in cases raising facial challenges to laws that vest in offi-
cials unbridled discretion over First Amendment activity need not
prove that any improper decisions have been made. In other words,
plaintiffs are not required to prove abuse of discretion, discrimina-
tion or actual content-based government conduct. For example, the
Court in City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co."' invali-
dated a city ordinance giving the mayor unbridled discretion over
whether to permit news racks on public property. The Court stated
that plaintiffs challenging discretionary First Amendment regula-
tions "have no way" of proving that actual decisions are "unconstitu-
tionally motivated." 5 The vice is in the existence of the "unbounded
discretion," and the opportunity for undetectable abuse."
There was no evidence in City of Lakewood that the mayor
granted or denied news rack permits for improper reasons. There
was no evidence in Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham7 or in NAACP v.
City of Richmond"' that the police chiefs granted or denied parade
permits for improper reasons. There was no evidence in Daily Her-
ald Co. v. Munro6 that election exit polling was barred for im-
proper reasons and there was no evidence in Carreras v. City of
Anaheim70 that the city officials granted or denied soliciting permits
for improper reasons. The First Amendment infirmity in all the
cases was that the government official had unbridled discretion to
grant or deny permits for expressive activity and nothing precluded
62. City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Pub. Co., 486 U.S. 750, 755 (1988). See also
Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 151 (1969); Gaudiya Vaishnava Society v. City
& County of San Francisco, 900 F.2d 1369, 1375 (9th Cir. 1990); Daily Herald Co. v.
Munro, 838 F.2d 380, 386-87 (9th Cir. 1988); Carreras v. City of Anaheim, 768 F.2d 1039,
1049 (9th Cir. 1985); NAACP v. City of Richmond, 743 F.2d 1346, 1357 (9th Cir. 1984);
accord, Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 553 (1975); Main Road v.
Aytch, 522 F.2d 1080, 1086-87 (3d Cir. 1975).
63. City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Pub. Co., 486 U.S. 750, 760 (1988).
64. 486 U.S. 750 (1988)
65. Id. at 760.
66. See Carreras v. City of Anaheim, 768 F.2d 1039, 1049 (9th Cir. 1985).
67. 394 U.S. 147 (1969).
68. 743 F.2d 1346 (9th Cir. 1984).
69. 838 F.2d 380 (9th Cir. 1988).
70. 768 F.2d 1039 (9th Cir. 1985).
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decisions based on unconstitutional reasons such as the content or
viewpoint of the applicant.
The First Amendment does not permit the government arbitrar-
ily to grant or deny a reporter access to sources of information made
available by the government. 1 In Sherrill v. Knight, the court held
that the Secret Service could not deny a journalist a White House
press pass unless "notice, opportunity to rebut, and a written deci-
sion" were provided "because the denial of a pass potentially in-
fringes upon first amendment guarantees. '7 2 The court also required
that the Secret Service publish the actual standard it employed to
determine whether an otherwise eligible journalist would be given a
White House press pass. 73
In the KQED case, there were no standards governing the war-
den's discretion in selecting press witnesses to executions.7 ' Penal
71. Sherrill v. Knight, 569 F.2d 124, 129 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
72. Id. at 128. See also Westinghouse Broadcasting Co. v. Dukakis, 409 F. Supp. 895,
896 (D. Mass. 1976) (right of news organizations to equal opportunity to cover official news
cannot be restricted unless compelling government interest); Quad-City Community News Ser-
vice, Inc. v. Jebens, 334 F. Supp. 8, 15, 17 (S.D. Iowa 1971) (classification between media
permitted and denied access to certain police information unconstitutional if merely has ra-
tional relationship to colorable state interest; any such classification must serve compelling state
interest and public official's discretion must be "guided by narrow and specific standards" that
advance that interest).
73. Sherrill, 569 F.2d at 130. In Sherrill, the reporter had been denied a White House
press pass for "reasons of security." Id. at 130. Even though the lawsuit involved "only one
newsman," the court required changes in the Secret Service's "policies and procedures with
respect to all press pass denials." Id. at 131 n.24 (emphasis added). KQED sought similar
relief in its case-reform of the process of selecting reporters to be press witnesses at state
executions.
74. There were far more applicants than space available for the Harris execution, so the
state officials were faced with deciding who would be allowed to cover the event first-hand. In
the past, selections were made on a neutral first-come, first- served basis. In other states selec-
tions are made by lot or by the press itself rather than by government officials. Reporter's
Transcript, 2-205, 2-219, 2-371, 2-388, 2-389, 3-418. For the scheduled 1990 Harris execu-
tion, however, the selections were turned over to Robert Gore, former Governor Deukmejian's
press secretary, a political appointee whose main job was to make sure that the Governor and
his programs got favorable coverage. Reporter's Transcript, 1-132. The press secretary had no
legal authority at all to decide which news organizations were allowed to cover the news, and
no authority over executions at San Quentin.
Nonetheless, Gore personally chose which news organizations would be included or ex-
cluded. For example, he excluded KCBS radio in San Francisco and substituted KNBR, he
eliminated all radio coverage in the Sacramento area, he reshuffled television stations in all
areas, he excluded all networks in favor of local stations and, most questionable of all, he
passed over the Sacramento Bee and included the Sacramento Union-even though the Bee's
circulation was four to five times greater and even though the Union was one of the few
organizations that had not even applied. Reporter's Transcript, 1-143; Pl. Exhs. 8, 9, 14, 15,
22, 67. Gore testified that he did not remember why he did this, but that he was "well aware"
of the "extremely negative" articles that the Bee's political columnist was writing at the time.
Reporter's Transcript, 1-143, 1-144, 1-170. The list resulting from Gore's selections did in-
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Code section 3605 is the only relevant statute, and it simply gives the
warden open-ended discretion to choose any "reputable citizens" to
his liking. California law empowers the warden to supervise execu-
tions but provides no neutral criteria to ensure that decisions about
press coverage of state executions are not based on improper consid-
erations like the "content or viewpoint" of the coverage or the press
organization.
Moreover, giving a government official unfettered discretion in
choosing which press organizations are allowed to witness state ex-
ecutions invites discrimination on the basis of the content of report-
ing perceived to be critical of the government official or his position,
or of the way in which an execution is handled.75 The First Amend-
ment, of course, prohibits the government from restricting access by
a particular organization or reporter based on the content of
publications.76
Because an execution is a major news event in California and
therefore access to it is of major significance to news reporters, and
because government officials alone control access, reporters dare not
alienate these officials lest they not be admitted or allowed to return.
The state policy does not preclude these impermissible bases for ac-
tion, and for that reason it violates the First Amendment. It restricts
not only free speech and activity by reporters and press organizations
but also the First Amendment rights of their viewers, listeners and
readers. "Not only newsmen and the publications for which they
write, but also the public at large have an interest protected by the
first amendment in assuring that restrictions on news gathering be
no more arduous then necessary, and that individual newsmen not be
arbitrarily excluded from sources of information." 7
Further, the press witness selections in the KQED case were
made by a person who had no legal authority to make them.7 8 The
relevant statute and regulation do not confer on the Governor's Press
elude print and broadcast organizations from all the major California population centers.
75. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 415 (1974) ("Not surprisingly, some
prison officials used the extraordinary latitude for discretion authorized by the regulations to
suppress unwelcome criticism."). Warden Vasquez testified in the KQED case that he in-
tended to monitor coverage of executions. Pl. Exh. 23, at 41.
76. Sherrill, 569 F.2d at 129. In American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. v. Cuomo,
570 F.2d 1080, 1083 (2d Cir. 1977), the court granted a preliminary injunction against exclu-
sion of a network from post-election events to which other media were permitted because such
discrimination between media would create a danger "that those of the media who are in
opposition or who the candidate thinks are not treating him fairly would be excluded. And
thus we think it is the public which would lose."
77. Sherrill, 569 F.2d at 129-30.
78. See supra note 74.
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Secretary the authority to issue permits to press organizations to
cover state executions. His are not security- based decisions; they are
political or public relations-based decisions."9
In short, the process by which press organizations were selected
to cover the 1990 Harris execution was invalid. It offered the oppor-
tunity for "manipulation of the news," and "hand-picking those in
attendance intensifies the manipulation."80 The court in the KQED
case failed to invalidate the process because it failed to apply the
correct First Amendment analysis.
IV. THE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE REPORTING
OF STATE EXECUTIONS
A. State Policies That Unjustifiably Interfere with Effective News
Reporting of Events to Which the Press Has Access Violate the First
Amendment
The very purpose of allowing reporters to witness a state execu-
tion is so that they can convey to members of the public at large
what happens there. To fulfill this purpose in a meaningful way and
to facilitate complete and accurate reporting reporters necessarily
need the tools of their trade. For television reporters, this means a
camera and a recorder.
In Houchins v. KQED, Inc.," the Court dealt with a similar
issue involving restrictions on television coverage of news events at a
county jail. Three Justices voted to reverse the preliminary injunc-
79. Both public relations and political criteria are clearly invalid bases for selecting
press witnesses. "Requiring a newspaper's reporter to pass a subjective compatibility-accuracy
test as a condition precedent to the right of that reporter to gather news is no different in kind
from requiring a newspaper to submit its proposed news stories for editing as a condition
precedent to the right of that newspaper to have a reporter cover the news. Each is a form of
censorship." Borreca v. Fasi, 369 F. Supp. 906, 909-10 (D. Haw. 1974).
80. Borreca, 369 F. Supp. at 910 (violation of First Amendment for official to bar re-
porter and newspaper from press conference).
For the Harris execution in 1992, the state officials revised the selection process. They
initially determine to allow seventeen press witnesses, seven from newspapers, two from the
Associated Press and United Press International and eight from television and radio stations.
Declaration of Phil Bronstein, April 20, 1992, filed in San Francisco Examiner v. Vasquez,
No. 153187 (Marin Co. Super. Ct.) (on file with the authors). Of the seven newspaper places,
four went to the largest circulation newspapers in the four largest metropolitan areas in the
state. Id. One went to the Matin Independent Journal on the ground that it was "closest to
San Quentin Prison." The other two were awarded by lot. Id. When the San Francisco Exam-
iner, which had covered all previous San Quentin executions and which was the only Bay
Area paper able to provide same-day coverage of a night execution, was excluded, it sued the
warden and won a temporary restraining order allowing it to witness the execution. San Fran-
cisco Examiner v. Vasquez, No. 153187 (Matin Co. Super. Ct.).
81. 438 U.S. 1, 16-19 (1978).
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tion that had allowed KQED access to the jail, and three Justices
voted to affirm. Justice Stewart wrote an opinion concurring with
the justices voting to affirm which, under the narrowest concurrence
rule,82 became the Court's binding precedent. 83 The opinion ex-
plained that although the Supreme Court's decisions had not yet es-
tablished a general First Amendment right of access to government
institutions, 84 when government does permit public access, the First
Amendment requires the government "to give members of the press
effective access." 85
The "critical role played by the press in American society" re-
quires attention to the "special needs of the press in performing [its
role] effectively." 86 Thus, "if a television reporter is to convey the
jail's sights and sounds to those who cannot personally visit the
place, he must use cameras and sound equipment. '87 Restrictions
imposed on the press are unreasonable "if they impede effective re-
porting without sufficient justification." '88 In Houchins, KQED was
found to be entitled to injunctive relief permitting the use of "cam-
eras and recording equipment for effective presentation to the view-
ing public of conditions at the jail as seen by individual visitors" in
the area in question.89
82. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977).
83. Only seven Justices took part in the consideration and decision of the Houchins case.
Given the division of the Court members, Justice Stewart's opinion governs: it is the "least
common denominator" of the Court's decision. It has long been the rule that "[w]hen a frag-
mented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of
five Justices, 'the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members
who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.' " Marks v. United States, 430
U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (quoting from Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976)). See
also McKoy v. N.C., 494 U.S. 433, 462 n.3 (1990) (dissenting opinion of Scalia, J., so treating
Justice White's concurring opinion in Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 389-90 (1988)); Is-
lamic Center of Miss. v. Starkville, 876 F.2d 465, 471 & n.26 (5th Cir. 1989) (so treating
Justice O'Connor's separate opinion in Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens Council,
483 U.S. 711 (1987)); McKenzie v. Kennickell, 875 F.2d 330, 332 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (same);
Fadhl v. City and County of San Francisco, 859 F.2d 649, 650 n.1 (9th Cir. 1988) (same);
Delaney v. Superior Court, 789 P.2d 934, 938 n.3 (Cal. 1990) (so treating Justice Powell's
separate opinion in Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 709-10 (1972)); Mitchell v. Superior
Court, 690 P.2d 625, 630 (Cal. 1984) (same); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW sec. 16-22, at 1529-30 & n.32 (2d ed. 1988) (so treating Justice Powell's sepa-
rate opinion in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 320 (1978)).
84. But see supra text accompanying notes 15-26.
85. 438 U.S. at 17 (emphasis in original).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 16, 17.
89. Id. at 18. Indeed, on remand in Houchins, the district court approved a resolution of
the case providing KQED with precisely the relief called for by Justice Stewart's opinion.
KQED v. Houchins, No. C-75 1257 WAI (N.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 1978).
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Under the rationale of Houchins, since reporters and other
members of the public witness executions, California must permit
the reporters to do an "effective" job, including using the tools of
their trade." In the reporting of state executions, television is indis-
pensable in allowing the public to see and hear, for themselves, what
a witness sees and hears, as opposed to having the information
filtered through a reporter who may or may not be able to convey, in
words, a sense of what the execution looked and sounded like. This
is especially true when all witnesses are hand-picked by government
officials and the event is so politically, emotionally, morally and re-
ligiously significant to different people in different ways.
It is not enough that print reporters are allowed to be present:
Many citizens likely rely on television as their sole source of
news. Further, visual impressions can and sometimes do add a
material dimension to one's impression of particular news
events. Television film coverage of the news provides a compre-
hensive visual element and an immediacy, or simultaneous as-
pect, not found in print media. Finally, the importance of con-
veying the fullest information possible increases as the
importance of the particular news event or news setting
increases."1
Limiting reports of state executions to words alone means that inac-
curate and incomplete information will be delivered to the public."
By contrast, the television camera is a neutral witness whose report-
ing is not handicapped by poor memory, misperceptions or bias." It
90. Houchins, 438 U.S. at 17 (emphasis in original).
91. Cable News Network v. ABC, 518 F. Supp. 1238, 1245 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (prelimi-
narily enjoining President from excluding television from certain White House events). As
Justice Powell has remarked, the public is "the loser" when news coverage is limited to
"watered-down verbal reporting, perhaps with an occasional still picture.... This is hardly
the kind of news reportage that the First Amendment is meant to foster." Zacchini v. Scripps-
Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 581 (1977) (Powell, J., dissenting). The California
Supreme Court recently noted in a different context that some events in the criminal process
are "simply indescribable in mere words" and therefore require photographic presentation.
People v. Thompson, 785 P.2d 857, 885 (Cal. 1990).
92. Cf People v. McDonald, 690 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1984), pointing out the frailties of
eyewitness testimony. Indeed, the evidence in KQED vividly demonstrated the potential for
inaccuracy that is introduced by depriving reporters of tools like tape recorders and cameras.
The print coverage of the 1967 Mitchell execution included completely inconsistent accounts of
what Mitchell said (muttering something about "Jesus Christ" or screaming "I am Jesus
Christ!"), whether he willingly entered the gas chamber or was "wrestled" in by two, three or
four guards, etc. Pl. Exh. 12.
93. The utility of having videotape to aid reporting and to serve as an accurate historical
redord of the event was well explained at trial by CBS News producer George Osterkamp:
Q. What advantages are there in having videotape of the event itself?
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is appropriate in a democratic society for citizens to be able to ob-
serve the ultimate sanction of our criminal justice system without
filtration through the unaided, faulty, or biased memories of wit-
nesses hand-picked by government. 9 As noted above, accurate citizen
A. The prominent one is that you have material to examine, to re-examine,
to reinforce your memory, your observations of the event.
So commonly, when you come back from a story, you have some notes that
you've taken, you have your own impressions, and then you have this wonderful
tool. You have this tape that is running often in real time when you can go back
and see what happened, and it helps you select the most important parts of the
event for inclusion in a news story.
Q. What difference would it make to the completeness and accuracy of
your coverage of an execution if you were not allowed to have videotape of it?
A. Well, again, we'd be relying on second- and third-hand information.
We'd be relying on peoples' memories and their ability to articulate what they
remember. It would be much less precise, much less accurate.
And for the historical record, whether it be somebody going back years
later doing a report or an obituary or whatever, there would be no solid record
of what happened. That seems to me the great advantage of videotape coverage.
The Court: What would that supply to the public that the press can't
supply?
The Witness: Well, I think the most important thing, Your Honor, is that
it would be a touchstone to which everybody could refer.
It would be clear whether the condemned cried out, or whether he mum-
bled something. It would be clear whether the process took ten minutes or eight
and a half minutes.
There would be-there would be a record that we could all go back to and
make our reports more accurate. Whether it be-whether it be print or broad-
casters, I think it would help us all.
Beyond that, there's information that's conveyed through a picture that
can't be conveyed through words.
Reporter's Transcript, 179, 185, 188-89. See also Reporter's Transcript, 2-197, 1-33, 80, 85-
86.
94. "[Clensorship in speaking and publishing is not the only form of censorship that
must be prevented. The process of filtering information-selectively releasing some information
while withholding other information-can be effectively used to prevent criticism and hide
mistakes. The first amendment guarantees apply to both forms of censorship." Society of Pro-
fessional Journalists v. Secretary of Labor, 616 F. Supp. 569, 576 (D. Utah 1985). In Society
of Professional Journalists, the court held that there is a First Amendment right of access to
traditionally open government administrative hearings and found, in language applicable to the
issue of direct television coverage, that furnishing a transcript is no substitute for direct
coverage:
The press and public are denied access to unfiltered information while it is still
fresh. A stale transcript is not an adequate substitute for access to the hearings
themselves .... Emotions, gestures, facial expressions, and pregnant pauses do
not appear on the reported transcript. Much of what makes good news is lost in
the difference between a one-dimensional transcript and an opportunity to see
and hear testimony as it unfolds.
Id. at 578 (citations omitted).
By analogy, by prohibiting television and limiting first-hand coverage to hand-picked re-
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awareness is especially important because the constitutionality of the
sanction itself (and, in California, the very existence of the death
penalty) depends on the public's values, evolving societal standards
and attitudes toward capital punishment."
In the KQED case, the warden argued that press coverage by
eyewitnesses without cameras or other reporting tools was perfectly
adequate to provide accurate information about executions. How-
ever, in defending the 1992 suit challenging the lethal gas method of
execution, the warden contested the reliability of the eyewitness re-
ports offered by the plaintiffs. He argued: "As far as the descriptions
[of executions] we have here, all we have are what people have been
able to observe, what they then attempt to intuit from that. That
doesn't tell us anything really about what actually happened ...
We don't know what they were observing. They may well be observ-
ing nothing more than their own distaste at watching this event hap-
pen."96 The court thus ruled that "[v]ideotaping the execution of
Robert Harris is necessary to preserve material evidence not other-
wise available from any other source. ' '97 It is ironic that the first
known videotaping of an American execution resulted from the war-
den's argument that eyewitness accounts, which he defended as suffi-
cient in the KQED case, were in fact unreliable.9
B. Insufficient Justification for Impeding Effective, Complete and
Accurate Reporting
There is no valid justification for denying reporters the basic
tools of their trade when covering executions. That executions take
place in a prison is not ipso facto a justification. Obviously the state
could not deny access to criminal trials by conducting them in
prisons.
California permits television coverage of all aspects of criminal
cases except executions. Television coverage of parole hearings at
porters, the warden would deprive the public-without any valid justification-of "unfiltered"
information about executions.
95. See supra note 43. As James Madison noted, "[a] popular government, without
popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy;
or, perhaps both. Knowledge will forever govern ignorance: And a people who mean to be
their own Governors, must arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives." Society of
Professional Journalists, 616 F. Supp. at 576-77 (quoting 9 WRITING OF JAMES MADISON
103 (G. Hunt ed. 1910)).
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San Quentin is authorized by the California Code of Regulations. 9
Clemency hearings in capital cases may be held in San Quentin,
open to television coverage. The San Quentin regulation permits a
condemned person to hold a televised news conference and a televised
interview when his execution is imminent. Television coverage of
capital trials is permitted under the California Rules of Court,
despite the presence of and potential effect on jurors and wit-
nesses. ' And California courts routinely permit the introduction of
gruesome pictures of victims and crime scenes in capital cases.'0°
Given photographic coverage of all these stages of the California
criminal justice process, both inside and outside of San Quentin and
with or without witnesses, there is no conceivable justification for
barring such coverage of the culmination and very goal of the pro-
cess: the state execution.01
The warden in the KQED case argued that his restrictions on
news coverage of executions amounted to a permissible time, place,
and manner restriction. However, "a constitutionally permissible
time, place, or manner restriction may not be based upon either the
content or subject matter of speech.'1 0 4
99. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. XV, § 2032 (1990).
100. CAL. R. CT. 980 (Deering Supp. 1992).
101. The Supreme Court, noting how technology has changed in recent years, has made
it clear that televising trials does not violate the rights ofthe defendant. Chandler v. Florida,
449 U.S. 560, 576 n.l (1981). What the Court said about the trial process is equally true of
executions: "no one has been able to present empirical data sufficient to establish that the mere
presence of the broadcast media inherently has an adverse effect on that process." 449 U.S. at
578-79.
102. See, e.g., People v. Thompson, 785 P.2d 857, 884-85 (Cal. 1990); People v. Cole-
man, 759 P.2d 1260, 1277-78 (Cal. 1988); People v. Ruiz, 749 P.2d 854, 866 (Cal. 1988).
103. The warden argued and Judge Schnacke agreed that because federal courts do not
generally permit television coverage of trials, executions afortior do not require such cover-
age. But this ignores the fact that the only reason given for denying camera coverage of federal
trials is the potential impact on jurors, witnesses and judges. See, e.g., Westmoreland v. CBS,
752 F.2d 16 (2d Cir. 1984): "distractions and diversions of judicial time; psychological effects
on jurors, witnesses, judges and lawyers; jeopardizing 'the required sense of solemnity, dignity
and the search for truth.' " 752 F.2d at 23 n.10 (citation omitted). None of these considerations
applies to an execution.
Moreover, the federal courts' policy has been revised, and the Judicial Conference has
authorized experimenting with using cameras during trials. See Report of the Judicial Confer-
ence Ad Hoc Committee on Cameras in the Courtroom, Sept., 1990; Federal Courts Are
Moving to Let in Radio and TV, THE N.Y. TIMES (National ed.), Sept. 13, 1990, at 14;
Michael Cecchio & Steve Hirsch, Federal Courts Will Experiment With Cameras, THE RE-
CORDER, Sept. 13, 1990, at 1. Federal courts also routinely allow sketch artists to use their
tools in the courtroom, which the warden nonetheless prohibited at executions.
104. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 536 (1980). See
Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972); Gaudiya Vaishnava Soc'y v. City and
County of San Francisco, 900 F.2d 1369, 1375 (9th Cir. 1990).
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The warden's policy restricting news coverage was based on
both content of the pictures and subject matter. His purported justifi-
cation was that pictures of executions might reveal the identity of
witnesses or officers, or inflame prisoners who see the pictures. But a
valid time, place and manner restriction must be 'Justified without
reference to the content of the regulated speech." 105 In other words,
if the reason for a restriction depends on the content of the speech,
the restriction must be considered content-based? ° The warden's al-
leged concerns about the impact of the broadcast on viewers (induc-
ing them to harm witnesses or officers, or to riot) meant that he
justified the policy based on the broadcast's content.10
Because the restrictions are content-based, they must be sub-
jected to "exacting scrutiny." The state must meet a " 'heavy burden'
of demonstrating that 'no reasonable alternatives, having a lesser im-
pact on First Amendment freedoms' are available."' ' The warden
did not meet the "heavy burden" of demonstrating that the restric-
tions are necessary to a vital state interest and that there is no less
restrictive alternative.
Regardless of whether the restrictions are viewed as content-
based or as time, place, and manner regulation, the warden's
prohibitions, as with any restrictions on news gathering, must be
carefully scrutinized to see whether "less restrictive alternatives" are
available "for each of these claimed threats."' 0 9 In the KQED case,
available options for dealing with the warden's concerns included:
105. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 320 (1988) (quoting Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Vir-
ginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. 435 U.S. 748, 71 (1976) (emphasis by the Court)).
106. 485 U.S. at 320.
107. Id. at 321. See Daily Herald Co. v. Munro, 838 F.2d 380, 386-87 (9th Cir. 1988)
(Daily Herald 11). Further, the restrictions on news coverage apply only to executions. Televi-
sion coverage of other events at San Quentin is permitted, including parole and clemency hear-
ings in capital cases. The no-pictures policy only applies to the "subject matter" of executions.
See Consolidated Edison Co., 447 U.S. at 536; Daily Herald H, 838 F.2d at 385.
108. Daily Herald Co. v. Munro, 758 F.2d 350, 359 (9th Cir. 1984) (Norris, J. concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting United States v. Sherman, 581 F.2d 1358, 1361
(9th Cir. 1978)). See Daily Herald II, 838 F.2d at 385; NAACP v. City of Richmond, 743
F.2d 1346,.1354-55 (9th Cir. 1984); United States v. Sherman, 581 F.2d 1358, 1361 (9th Cir.
1978).
109. Sherman, 581 F.2d at 1361 (invalidating court order intended "to protect jurors
from harassment"); Daily Herald II, 838 F.2d at 385-86 (invalidating statute limiting exit
polls intended to protect against disritption of polling place).
In authorizing the videotaping of the 1992 Harris execution for evidence preservation
purposes, the court directed that the operator "videotape Harris only. [He] may not videotape
anyone who is watching the execution or anyone involved in carrying out the execution."
Fierro v. Vasquez, No. C 92 1482 MNP (N.D. Cal. Apr. 21, 1992). The court further di-
rected that no copies be made and that the tape be deposited with the court under seal. Id.
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(1) instructing the camera operator not to take pictures of identifi-
able witnesses or officers; (2) instructing the camera operator not to
turn the camera on until the condemned person has been strapped
into the gas chamber chair and the officers are out of sight; (3) using
the venetian blinds already in place in the gas chamber to conceal
the executioner staff; (4) electronically masking the identity of any-
one accidentally captured on videotape; (5) reviewing the film before
broadcast or publication to make sure no witness or officer is identi-
fiable; and (6) retaining or destroying the original or master video-
tape so that no unmasked copies can be made.
In other words, as in Press Enterprise II v. Superior Court"°
and Globe Newspaper Co. v. United States,"' where the State's in-
terests in protecting the privacy of jurors and witnesses were held
insufficient to override First Amendment values, protecting the iden-
tity of official witnesses and officers is not an overriding interest that
cannot be served by less restrictive means." 2 Moreover, the policy is
not narrowly tailored to serve the interests articulated. Even viewed
as a content-neutral "manner" restriction designed to protect prison
security, the policy "does not sufficiently serve those public interests
that are urged as its justification.""'  The connection between the use
of normal reporting tools and any perceived harm is too attenuated.
The warden asserted as the first reason for forbidding tape recorders
and cameras that official witnesses and officers may be "harassed" or
attacked. Any such harm is so remote, however, as to be entirely
speculative. For harm to result, all of the following would have to
occur: (1) despite directions to the contrary, a camera would capture
the face or features of an identifiable witness or officer; (2) despite
the availability of electronic "masking""' and directions to the con-
110. 478 U.S. 1 (1986).
111. 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
112. Nor is there any threat to security posed by allowing cameras in the gas chamber.
There has been frequent television access to the chamber. The warden even furnishes video-
tape to the media for file use, and the tape discloses much detail that cannot be observed by
actual witnesses to executions. Of course the witnesses allowed at executions are free to see
with their own eyes, at close range, whatever a camera could see. The witnesses include those
chosen by the condemned man himself, presumably those with the greatest motivation to retali-
ate against the persons who put him to death. Finally, even an important state interest must
often yield to First Amendment values. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989)
(protecting national flag as symbol of nationhood); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403
U.S. 713 (1971) (protecting national security); Bay Area Peace Navy v. United States, 914
F.2d 1224 (9th Cir. 1990) (protecting against acts of terrorism and ensuring maritime safety).
113. United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 181 (1983).
114. The evidence showed that any person's identity may be electronically obliterated by
standard techniques commonly used in broadcast news. Pl. Exh. 5.
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trary, the person's face or features would remain in the tape as
broadcast; (3) the identity of the person would not be known to the
potential attacker but for the broadcast and would be known simply
from his or her physical appearance; (4) the potential attacker would
be so inflamed by the fact that the witness or officer attended the
execution that he or she would be induced to try to harm the witness
or officer; (5) the attacker would successfully track down and locate
the witness or officer wherever he or she might be; and (6) the at-
tacker would criminally harm the officer or witness.11 In other
words, there is "an insufficient nexus with any of the public interests
that may be thought to undergird" the policy prohibiting cameras
and recorders." 6
The other security "concerns" voiced by the San Quentin war-
den also fail. The "suicidal cameraperson" concern borders on fan-
tasy. But even accepting it at face value, the evidence in the KQED
trial was that it would be easy to place a camera on a bolted-down
tripod a safe distance from the gas chamber glass, or to mount the
camera on a bracket on a pillar in the witness area, like a surveil-
lance camera. No one would have an opportunity to hurl it at the
glass in an attempt to abort the execution.
The fact that prisoners might see the execution on television
and be provoked to riot or retaliate against someone is no basis for
prohibiting camera coverage. In the first place, the prisoners know
that an execution is taking place and doubtless will see live television
coverage of that fact. The coverage might include, for example, a
reporter at the gates of San Quentin in front of a mob screaming
"Stop the Killing!" There is no reason to believe that prisoners
would be more inflamed by viewing, instead, the quiet, clinical scene
inside the gas chamber. Moreover, any well-managed prison should
be able to contain a predictable disturbance by keeping prisoners in
their cells and taking whatever special security precautions are ap-
propriate. The causal links from seeing an execution to inflicting
harm because of seeing it are too attenuated, as noted above.
Finally, it is feasible for the prison, which is on a closed-circuit
cable system, to black-out television reception by the prisoners.
Rather than deprive the prisoners of television reception, however,
the San Quentin warden elected to black-out the entire general pub-
115. This far-fetched scenario is even more unlikely if one supposes that the potential
attacker is a prisoner. Prisoners have no access to outside witnesses and only accidental access
to a particular officer in their own prison.
116. See United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 181 (1983).
19921 1159
1160 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32
lic, using possible prisoner reaction as the justification.117 The secur-
ity concerns that the warden advanced at trial were, at best, after-
thoughts. He testified at a deposition early in the litigation that the
only reason for prohibiting the use of electronic recording equipment
was concern about disclosing the identities of citizen witnesses and
officers on the execution team."' Refuting the warden's testimony
that prison gangs might cause trouble if one of their members were
executed on television, former California prison director Raymond
Procunier testified: "I would be terribly concerned that if - if tele-
vising the death penalty is a decision that's a political or judicial
117. No security problem has been reported from the videotaping of the 1992 Harris
execution pursuant to the court order in Fierro v. Vasquez, No. C 92 1482 MHP (N.D. Cal.
Apr. 21, 1992). The videotaping was done by an agent of Harris' counsel, not by an impartial
press camera person.
All the warden's alleged security concerns were addressed and refuted by KQED expert
witness Raymond Procunier, California's former Director of Corrections, who probably has
more experience in corrections than anyone in the country. The evidence that a camera makes
no noise and requires no lighting, that it could be adequately searched (just as prison officials
routinely search cameras that they allow into the prisons for other purposes), that it could be
bolted down so that it would pose no danger to the gas chamber, and that there were several
locations from which photographs can be taken without disclosing the identity of witnesses or
staff, was not rebutted. Nor did the warden offer evidence that still cameras pose any risk to
security.
Indeed, the warden's proffered reasons for prohibiting normal reporting tools were so
insubstantial or so easily dealt with by less restrictive means as to suggest pretext. There was
evidence that the real reasons had nothing to do with prison security. Reporter's Transcript, 3-
463, 3-464 (Vasquez: "[Ilt would detract from ...[the] dignity we try to put into that very
difficult situation. ... ); 3-479 (Vasquez: "I don't want it to turn into any kind of a specta-
cle"); 1-181 (Kindel: "don't want this turned into a circus"); 2-213, 2-214, 2-215 (former
director: "thought it was not an appropriate item for public viewing"); 1-147 (Governor's
public relations director: "wouldn't be in good taste").
118. He testified as follows:
Q. And to be specific, the security problem that you're worried about is
disclosure of the names of the witnesses?
A. The names and identities of the witnesses, the names and identities of
the officers involved.
Q. And nothing else?
A. That's correct. Names and identities also of the inmate's witnesses, you
know. That is also something that I find I have to worry about ....
Q. All right. Is there a security reason for not allowing cameras to be
brought in.by a press witness to an execution?
A. Yes.
Q. What is that?
A. They're all the same ones that I've just recounted for the other two
questions of yours.
Q. And nothing additional?
A. No.
Q. And that applies to both still and television cameras; is that right?
A. That's correct.
PI. Exh. 23 at 12 (emphasis added).
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decision, I would hate to see this country deteriorate to the point
where a few gang members would keep us from making that deci-
sion. . . .Corrections people, if you don't - if you're not careful,
take on the additional roles that they're going to set the standards for
the morals of the - and run a lot of things that's none of their
business." '
Squeamishness about whether it is "in good taste" to put execu-
tions on televisions, or concern about whether the public might be
displeased obviously is not an appropriate judgment for prison offi-
cials (or courts) to make.120 Nor can the fact that such news report-
ing may engender angry debate justify banning television. The Su-
preme Court's precedents "recognize that a principal 'function of
free speech under our system of government is to invite dispute. It
may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of
unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even
stirs people to anger.' "121
Moreover, it is not in fact uncommon to see both executions and
119. Reporter's Transcript, 2-350.
120. In pretrial submissions in the KQED case, the warden said that allowing television
coverage would frustrate the state public policy expressed in California Penal Code section
3605 by permitting minors under eighteen years of age to "witness" executions. The statute
says only that minors should not be among the witnesses selected to be physically in the gas
chamber facility; this was not an issue in the KQED case. If the statute were read as prohibit-
ing television coverage of executions in order to prevent minors from seeing a broadcast report
of an execution, it would be both (1) preempted by the Federal Communications Act (47
U.S.C. § 151) and (2) invalid under the First Amendment:
(1) It has long been the law that "Congress intended the regulatory scheme set out [in the
Federal Communications Act] to be exclusive of state action," so that states may not regulate
the content of broadcasts. See, e.g., Allen B. Dumont Laboratories v. Carroll, 184 F.2d 153,
155 (3d Cir. 1950); cf. City of New York v. FCC, 486 U.S. 57 (1988) (preemption of state
and local technical standards for cable television); Farmers Educ. & Coop. Union v. WDAY,
360 U.S. 525 (1959) (preemption of state defamation law). An individual state cannot pre-
scribe what may be broadcast on the Nation's airwaves.
(2) Even for the purpose of protecting minors from "unsuitable" material, a statute can-
not thereby validly prohibit the dissemination of non-obscene pictures to adults. See, e.g., Sable
Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989) (prohibition of "indecent" sexual material in-
valid); Interstate Circuit v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676 (1968) (ordinance prohibiting distribution of
movies "not suitable for young persons" invalid); Interstate Circuit v. Dallas, 366 F.2d 590,
597-99 (5th Cir. 1966) (same as to ordinance prohibiting non-obscene movies "describing or
portraying brutality, criminal violence or depravity"). Government restrictions "may not 're-
duce the adult population ... to [receiving] only what is fit for children.'" Sable Communica-
tions, 492 U.S. at 128, quoting from Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 73
(1983) and Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957).
121. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (quoting in part Terminiello v. Chicago,
337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949)). As the Supreme Court recently noted in the flag-burning case, "any
suggestion that the Government's interest in suppressing speech becomes more weighty as pop-
ular opposition to that speech grows is foreign to the First Amendment." United States v.
Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2404, 2409 (1990).
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assassinations on American television-recent broadcasts include ex-
ecutions in Iraq, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Vietnam, simu-
lated but very realistic executions on "L.A. Law"1I 2 and other pro-
grams, and assassinations of Robert and John F. Kennedy, Martin
Luther King, Jr., Lee Harvey Oswald and others. 2 The state can-
not seriously contend that only the executions performed by our own
government are inappropriate for television.
CONCLUSION
There is every likelihood that, for the next or a future execution
in California, a news organization will request to cover the event
with broadcast equipment. When this happens, the analysis of this
article should lead the state officials or the courts to decide that: (1)
the State may not completely exclude reporters from attending the
execution (the San Quentin warden is of course under an order to
this effect in the final judgment in the KQED case); (2) the process
by which news organizations are selected to be among the witnesses
must be objective and based on articulable neutral criteria, and must
preclude selection on the basis of impermissible factors such as polit-
ical favoritism or the content of coverage; and (3) unobtrusive broad-
cast equipment may not be prohibited. Whether broadcast coverage
is aired is a decision properly made by newspersons and not by the
government officials involved in the event.
Indeed, in the broadest sense, the question raised by the KQED
litigation is whether it is the press or the government who properly
makes the decisions about how the news should be covered. Under
our First Amendment, the answer should be obvious.
122. See NBC television broadcast, May 17, 1990.
123. Still photographs of executions, including those mentioned above, are also com-
monly seen in the press. See, e.g., NEWSWEEK, June 4, 1990, at 28-29 (vivid photographs of
public executions in China).
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